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In the current global environment, the practice of dehumanization—the stripping away of 
common attributes among people that call for respect and constrain violence—and the 
misperception it creates have resulted in misguided attempts by militaries to influence the 
center of gravity in irregular warfare, the civilian population. Traditional thought in this 
matter implies that cultural training is the most important factor in creating more 
effective influence when dealing in irregular warfare scenarios. By examining 
dehumanization and the factors that cause it in irregular warfare environments, this thesis 
will provide a framework for how dehumanization impacts influence operations. My 
analysis seeks to explain how dehumanization occurs and how it can be prevented, 
thereby setting necessary conditions for effective population influence. 
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In 2009, I was deployed to Afghanistan to conduct Village Stability Operations 
(VSO). The area of Afghanistan was Khakrez, and the first U.S. forces to establish bases 
had only arrived seven months ago. Because of this, Khakrez had been considered 
dominated by the Taliban. During this time, I chose to fast for Ramadan. At the time I 
was living with Afghans, so my fasting became common knowledge among the local 
population. I chose to fast for Ramadan because I felt it would be an effective way to 
build rapport with the Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF) team that lived in 
the same house as my Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) team. Also, it would ensure 
that I would not attempt to push the ANASF soldiers too hard during this time and our 
operational tempo would properly reflect what Afghans were doing during Ramadan. 
However, soon after beginning my fast I noticed that whenever I initially met an Afghan, 
someone who was with me would explain that I was fasting during Ramadan. The frank 
conversations that followed led me to believe that the act of fasting had shifted the way 
Afghans perceived me. These frank conversations began to build relationships of mutual 
trust and respect, and became essential as I negotiated with local power brokers to 
increase their support for the government, rejecting the Taliban. This new perception led 
me to question what had changed. This thesis offers an explanation for what I believe 
occurred. 
This thesis will examine how cross-cultural misunderstandings, a core result of 
dehumanization, occur during times of conflict. These misunderstandings affect the 
ability to influence and control populations, particularly during Unconventional Warfare 
(UW), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Counter Terrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID), and Stability Operations.1 This thesis will also consider factors that contribute to 
the dehumanization that occurs during the conduct of irregular warfare and how these 
factors can be minimized to improve the ability to influence populations. This study is 
                                                 
1 Irregular warfare is a broader term that includes these types of operations.  
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meant to clarify the impact that dehumanization has both at the tactical level and when 
establishing strategic goals. I am using the lens of Village Stability Operations (VSO) in 
Afghanistan in order to create a framework for connecting dehumanization to operations 
during population-centric warfare.  
U.S. strategy in COIN conflicts is often defined as a fight to win the “hearts and 
minds”2 of the population. Despite this thrust, no concerted effort has been made to study 
what leads to dehumanization (or its opposite, humanization) with respect to our ability to 
influence populations abroad. Dehumanization is found across cultures and serves as a 
means to deny people their individual differences and create biases in one group against 
members of another group.3 It is usually based on differences between race and 
ethnicity.4 This creation of an out-group or in-group can even be artificially created. For 
instance, during Muzafer Sherif’s Robbers Cave Experiment, Sherif took a group of 22, 
white Oklahoma City adolescents and divided them into two groups of 11 located at a 
“summer camp.” These groups, without any outside provocation, began to discriminate 
and eventually act out violently against one another, essentially turning the other group 
into a ‘them’.5 The campers’ spontaneous division into an in-group and an out-group 
impacted their ability to work together and even led to spontaneous violence.6  
The development of in-groups and out-groups is also important in population-
centric warfare. Population-centric warfare is defined as warfare in which the main aim is 
to influence the behavior of a target population, whether in a COIN or UW context.7 By 
exploring the factors that lead to or enable dehumanization, my aim is to assist in 
                                                 
2 United States Army. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. (2006). Once the unit settles into the AO, its next task 
is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises 
two separate components. “Hearts” means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN 
success. “Minds” means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless. p. 
A-5. 
3 Susan Opotow, “Aggression and Violence,” in Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and 
Practice, eds. M. Deutsch and P.T. Coleman, 403–427 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 417. 
4 Nick Haslam, “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review,” Personality and Social Psychology 
Review10 (2006) 252–264 
5 Muzafer Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, et al., Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers 
Cave Experiment. (Oklahoma City: University Book Exchange, 1961), 120–148. 
6 Ibid, 148. 
7 United States Army. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. (2006). 
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countering this type of cross-cultural misunderstanding, one that I have seen plague 
counterinsurgency strategy in both its development and implementation. 
The topic of this thesis raises several questions. For instance, what is 
dehumanization’s tactical impact when it comes to influencing the population in a 
conflict? How has dehumanization played out in other conflicts? And, ultimately, how 
can we leverage lessons learned from answering these questions to improve our ability to 
function in foreign cultures in the future? One important distinction must be made. This 
thesis contends that by focusing on humanizing ourselves and members of the foreign 
population with whom we are interacting, we will be able to better influence and 
communicate with the population overall, leading to our ability to achieve our strategic 
goals. This thesis is not arguing that population-centric warfare is the only or even the 
best way to defeat an insurgency. Rather, if we are going to wage population centric 
warfare, being able to communicate with the population is essential, and dehumanization 
represents a significant impediment to that goal. 
Dehumanization is not a new phenomenon in inter-human conflict.  Man has 
arguably always “dehumanized” his adversaries in order to coerce, maim, or, ultimately, 
kill them while avoiding the problems of conscience. “War not only departs from the 
normal; it inverts all that is moral and right: In war one should kill, should steal, should 
burn cities and farms, should perhaps even rape matrons and little girls.”8 By stripping 
away his opponents’ humanity, a combatant can turn his adversaries into objects 
deserving of wrath; doing this also helps justify violence. Dehumanization still occurs 
today in developed and undeveloped societies throughout the international system. But 
again, the focus of this thesis is specifically on the impact that dehumanization has, in its 
various forms, on a security force’s ability to influence the population locally. 
Because the primary purpose of most militaries is to win their nations’ wars, the 
training for war often includes significant propaganda designed to dehumanize the 
                                                 
8 Barbara Ehrenreich, Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 1997), 12. 
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targeted enemy.9 However, in its collective social form, dehumanization creates 
miscalculations in the desires of and understanding about a population and therefore has a 
larger impact on military strategy than is reflected in just genocide or civilian casualties. 
“Demonizing and dehumanizing the enemy is an old and familiar practice. It’s an 
effective means of simplifying a conflict for the public, instilling a sense of victimization 
and taking the moral high ground. We called Germans Rhine monkeys and krauts. The 
Japanese nips, the Viet Cong slopes and Charlie. In Iraq and Afghanistan we took an 
Arabic term of respect, haji, and derisively applied it to the entire population.”10 
Dehumanization often serves as the tool to distance the killer from his target to enable 
killing behavior.11 But—and this is a key point—enabling a soldier to kill his adversary 
represents a very different tool than that required to enable a soldier to influence and 
shape a population’s behaviors. 
B. APPROACH 
What, meanwhile, is dehumanization? This thesis will examine dehumanization 
and communication theory in order to better understand how theories about both interact 
with one another. The intent is to determine where dehumanization has prevented 
effective communication during operations meant to influence populations. This thesis 
will treat counterinsurgency operations as an exemplification of population-centric 
warfare and will study the impact of dehumanization on various counterinsurgency 
campaigns in history. Surveying different counterinsurgency operations in different 
regions with different goals will demonstrate both the universal difficulties 
dehumanization causes and the successes that can accrue when dehumanization is 
overcome. 
                                                 
9 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, rev. ed. 
(New York: Black Bay Books/Little, Brown, 2009). 
 10 J.E. McCollough, “Knowing Thy Enemy,” Time Magazine, May 7 2013. 
http://nation.time.com/2013/05/07/knowing-thy-enemy/#ixzz2UFZHJZVf 
 11 Grossman, On Killing, 187. 
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In the second chapter, three important questions will be asked and answered: 
What is dehumanization? How does communication work? And finally, how does 
dehumanization impact that communication? 
In the third chapter, three vignettes will be discussed to better illustrate the points 
described in Chapter Two. These will focus on localized events, mainly because 
dehumanization is a localized event; in one area of a conflict it can occur, while in other 
areas it may not. The three cases represent the good and bad of dehumanization 
minimization or its occurrence. These highlight different aspects of dehumanization: its 
harmful results, as well as the positive impacts when it is minimized. 
The fourth chapter provides a more recent example and draws heavily on my 
experiences in Afghanistan. The purpose of this chapter is to describe VSO and explain 
how some of the tenets of this strategy led to success in fighting dehumanization, 
resulting in better population influencing operations. This chapter will also describe some 
of the strategic impacts that can be distilled from VSO, specifically in reference to 
reducing dehumanization and allowing troops conducting influencing operations a better 
chance for tactical success.  
The Conclusion integrates the prior discussion and makes two main points. The 
first is that our traditional Special Forces cultural training, by focusing on differences 
between cultures, actually sets the conditions for the first step in dehumanization, and 
needs to focus more on our cross-cultural similarities rather than on differences. The 
second is that our strategies need to build on tactical ownership and investment in local 
areas if we want our troops to be effective in population-centric counterinsurgency, and 
that this is best accomplished with a VSO-like strategy where dehumanization is 
prevented and conditions are set for improved cross-cultural understanding.  
  
 6 
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II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. DEHUMANIZATION 
An introduction to dehumanization will begin by discussing its definition and will 
utilize a model that demonstrates many of the warped perceptions of others that 
dehumanization can cause. “Dehumanization is a psychological construct which has been 
very broadly defined as the denial of humanness to others, the negative consequences of 
which … include various forms of antisocial behavior, especially violence directed 
toward those dehumanized.”12 Because dehumanization is a psychological process it only 
occurs within the person doing the dehumanizing. It only really affects the perceptions of 
the person who is doing the dehumanizing. Dehumanization does not change the outside 
world, but impacts the ability of a person to accurately realize what is occurring. “But in 
the process of dehumanizing the enemy in our own minds, we lose sight of the fact we’ve 
done nothing to change them. We’ve only changed ourselves, and how we see them. 
They remain as human as ever. As human as we.”13  
The literature often focuses on genocide as a result of dehumanization. Yet, 
ineffective influence, while less drastic, is just as prominent a result of dehumanization. 
This chapter will describe and define two essential components that will serve as the 
basis for my argument about the need to change how cultural training is conducted. The 
first component reflects how dehumanization arises and what results from this behavior. 
The second relates to how communication works and the role communication plays in 
influence.  
In his article introducing a model of dehumanization, Nick Haslam breaks down 
much of the research about causes.14 Race, ethnicity, gender, disability, delegitimization 
                                                 
12 Arlen Moller and Edward Deci, “Interpersonal Control, Dehumanization, and Violence: A Self-
determination Theory Perspective,” Group Processes and Intergroup Relations13 (2009): 43. 
13 J.E. McCollough, “Knowing Thy Enemy,” Time Magazine, May 7 2013. 
http://nation.time.com/2013/05/07/knowing-thy-enemy/#ixzz2UFZHJZVf 
14 Haslam, “Dehumanization,” 252–264. 
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and moral exclusion are all factors involved in dehumanization.15 Haslam further breaks 
down dehumanization into denying others’ uniquely human characteristics and human 
nature. One sees his model in Figure 1. I am focusing on the “Human Uniqueness” 
section because this is what applies to culture and socialization.16 Animalistic 
dehumanization and its five underlying factors represent an unrealistic understanding of a 
separate group. These five factors form the basis for the stereotypes and unrealistic 
understanding of a group due to dehumanization. 
 
Figure 1.  Dehumanization Model17 
The use of race and ethnicity to dehumanize, ascribing less humanness to little 
known or understood cultures is an old phenomenon.18 But, as shown by Halsam’s 
                                                 
15 Ibid, 252–254. 
16 Ibid, 256. 
17 Ibid, 257. 
18 Gustav Jahoda, Images of Savages: Ancient Roots of Modern Prejudice in Western Culture, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1999). 
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model, the categories that feed dehumanization are varied. Dehumanization is simply the 
process by which two groups are created, an “us” and a “them,” where the “them” is 
denied humanness.19 First, the “us,” or in-group is created, based on set, but fluid criteria. 
This is followed by the creation of a “them,” or the out-group.20 Dehumanization, by this 
definition, denies a group of people their humanity and serves as a means to deny people 
their individual differences and yields or fuels biases against the created out-group.21 
The existence of dehumanization has been well documented during warfare, and 
also exists in irregular warfare. In its more extreme forms, dehumanization can result in 
events like the Rape of Nanking, or the genocide in Rwanda of Tutsi by the Hutu. During 
World War II, for instance, distinct propaganda products were designed to make the 
Japanese look less than human. (See Figure 2.) But dehumanization can also be much 
more subtle, like common usage of the derogatory term “gook” to describe enemy 
combatants and civilians alike during U.S. combat operations in Vietnam. Or, to cite an 
example from our current conflict(s), the use of the term Haji to refer to Muslims. 
Name calling itself is a form of dehumanization, one that strips away some human 
aspects of members of an out-group. As the rest of this chapter will show, even minor 
instances of dehumanization can have a large impact on a soldier’s ability to then 
influence the created out-group.22 
                                                 
19 Moller and Deci, “Interpersonal Control,” 43.  
20 Berreby, Us and Them: Understanding the Tribal Mind (New York: Little, Brown, 2005), 32–45. 
21 Haslam, “Dehumanization,” 262. 
22 Robert Kimmel, “Culture and Conflict,” in Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, 
ed. M. Deutsch and P.T. Coleman, 453–474, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 458. 
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Figure 2.  Dehumanization Example (World War II) From thepardu.wordpress.com 
Dehumanization creates miscalculations in cross-cultural understandings and 
impacts how populations react to events and attempts at communication.23 It is these 
miscalculations that arguably impact the most important aspect of population-centric 
warfare, a population’s reaction to efforts to influence it. Often counterinsurgency is said 
to be a fight to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of a certain population.24 Dehumanization 
creates conditions that run directly counter to that goal in the form of moral 
disengagement.25 Specifically, moral disengagement allows for aggression and violence 
to be considered justified and deserved or fair when used against members of an out-
group.26 “To the extent that the victims are dehumanized, principles of morality no 
longer apply to them and moral restraints against killing are more readily overcome.”27 
One of the main conditions for this is denying the humanity and deservingness of ‘others’ 
by derogating them. Central to fighting a population-centric conflict is having an 
understanding and appreciation of the people.28 However, because dehumanization 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 460. 
24 United States Army. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. (2006). 
25 Susan Opotow, “Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction,” Journal of Social Issues 46: 1–
20. 
26 Herbert Kelman, “Violence without Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and 
Victimizers”, Varieties of Psychohistory, ed. G. M. Kren & L. H. Rappoport, 282–314 (New York: 
Springer, 1973), 301. 
27 Opotow, “Aggression and Violence,” 417. 
28 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 2nd Ed. (Westport: Praeger 
Security International, 2006), 4. 
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results in an inability to want to try to understand the dehumanized out-group, problems 
in dealing with that out-group will invariably arise.  
Much of the current literature on dehumanization focuses on the moral factors and 
casual factors that contribute to dehumanization. Most often it is studied as the main 
component of genocide.29 When dehumanization occurs, the process that leads to 
genocide is an emphasis on an out-group and an in-group, resulting in the systematic 
killing of the out-group.30 Therefore, for this thesis, it is important to draw connections 
between incidents of dehumanization and negative impacts short of genocide, as we find 
these in irregular warfare specifically.  
In-group, out-group biases exist in every society and culture on earth.31 While this 
bias is distinct from dehumanization, it is rather, a gateway to dehumanization. In-groups 
and out-groups are the result of categorization.  
Categories like Americans and Iranians, Muslims and Christians, blacks 
and whites, men and woman, southerners and northerners, doctors and 
lawyers, gays and straights, soccer moms and NASCAR dads, outgoing 
people and shy types, smart ones and lucky ones. Those—and all other 
labels that define more than one person but fewer than all—are what I call 
“human kinds.”32 
Despite the fact that some of these in-group and out-group biases can seem 
harmless, their cumulative effects lead to dehumanization and negative results. 
Categorization into these two groups serves to establish shortcuts for how individuals 
who do not have traits similar in any number of categories to see members of the out-
group as less than human. “The combined effort of architecture, clothing, speech, and 
behavior all nudge the unconscious mind to think stigma about ‘those people’ is true. 
These techniques speak in the language of Us-Them codes making them confirm for the 
                                                 
29 Gregory Stanton, “The Eight Stages of Genocide”, 1998. recovered from 
www.genocidewatch.org/8stages.htm 
30 Kelman, “Violence without Restraint”, 300. 
31 Neil Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, (New York: Plenum Press, 
1996), 247. 
32 Berreby. Us and Them, 14–15. 
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rest of the mind that those people really are ‘not right.’”33 It follows from this description 
that someone from an out-group, that is seen as “not right” would be difficult for a 
member of an in-group to understand. 
In many total war34 scenarios, and virtually all conflicts, opponents typically 
engage in extensive dehumanization campaigns in order to create an effective fighting 
force.35 This means that often part of the run up to sending troops to war includes 
dehumanizing influences. However, according to counterinsurgency strategy, the 
population in question is centrally important. Although to humanize, or accept the central 
point of the humanness of the opponent, may make you less effective in direct action, it 
can lead to additional effectiveness when it comes to indirect action and population-
centric approaches.  
Simplification of diverse groups is more likely to take place when the conflict is 
waged in a culturally complex environment with many sub-groups. Dehumanization can 
result from this simplification. “In more diverse, urbanized, industrialized and specialized 
societies, individuals rely more on pragmatic rather than consensual criteria in their 
reasoning.”36 The complexity in an environment can then feed into cognitive 
simplification in dealing with an out-group, which is a precondition for dehumanization. 
This, in turn, creates conditions for disequilibrium in society.37 Often the very fact that a 
society with many competing cultures within in it is out of equilibrium is enough to begin 
an irregular conflict.38 Forces that then have to choose one side over another will often 
find it easier to focus on themselves rather than the population involved in the irregular 
conflict. The social landscape proves too complex for them to navigate. Tactically, in 
such settings, dehumanization flows out of their penchant to think in terms of stereotypes. 
                                                 
33 Ibid, 240. 
34 Total War is the highest end of conflict in Full Spectrum Operations, and is defined by U.S. Army 
Joint Publication 1-02 as “armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the 
belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.” 
35 Grossman, On Killing. 
36 Kimmel, “Culture and Conflict,” 459. 
37 Chalmers Ashby Johnson. Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966, 15–39. 
38 Ibid, 59–87. 
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As demonstrated by many dealings by U.S. forces with the Vietnamese during the 
Vietnam War, dehumanization is often ingrained in the organizational culture during the 
conflict due to misunderstandings about the cultural complexity of the environment. 
“Americans were ignorant about the Vietnamese not because we were stupid, but because 
we believe certain things about ourselves. Those things necessarily distorted our vision 
and confused our minds in ways that made learning extraordinarily difficult.”39 The need 
to address this “enabling ignorance,” and the need to change how a force conducting 
influence operations thinks and communicates leads to  the next section of this thesis.  
B. COMMUNICATION 
Communication consists of source, message, and destination.40 Further broken 
down, communication at each level must be coded and decoded by the source and 
audience. The essence of this process, which is about conveying the right message to the 
audience, is the goal of communication. Communication can also be broken down into 
the source, encoder, signal, decoder, and destination.41 It is essential that the decoder or 
target of the communication, and the encoder, the person making the communication, be 
in tune, like a radio antenna. This is because a figurative interpreter separates the decoder 
and encoder.42 The processes that occur within the encoder who creates a message, and 
the decoder who then understands the message, are what are so essential to influence. The 
key is to be clear when communicating a message, so that the decoder understands 
exactly what is being communicated.  
What is most important to an encoder who creates the message is to elicit the 
desired response from the message sent. There are requirements of this: the message must 
be designed and delivered so as to gain the attention of the intended recipient; it must 
employ signs that refer to experience common to the source and recipient; in order to get 
the meaning across, it must arouse personal needs in the recipient and suggest some ways 
                                                 
39 Loren Baritz, Backfire (New York: William Morrow and Company, INC, 1985), 25, 26. 
40 Wilber Schramm, “How Communication Works,” in Mass Media and Society, ed. Alan Wells and 
Ernst Hakanen, 51–75 (Greenwich, CT: Ablex, 1997), 51. 
41 Ibid, 52. 
42 Ibid, 52–54. 
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to meet those needs; finally, it must suggest a way to meet those needs that is appropriate 
to the group situation in which the recipient finds himself at the time when he is moved to 
make the desired response.43 The message is much more likely to succeed if it fits with 
the patterns of understandings, attitudes, values, and goals that a receiver already has. 
However, the encoder can only control one aspect of the message, the sent portion. This 
means the importance of the message, and interpreting the decoder’s response to the 
message, are vital for successful communication. In Figure 3, we see Schramm’s model 
of communication, to include the feedback loop. 
  
Figure 3.  Schramm’s Model of Communication44 
Integral to Schramm’s feedback loop is the interpretation that goes on inside each 
actor’s head. It is here where patterns of understanding and the ability to influence a 
target make a difference. If any confusion takes place during this internal interpretation, 
the meaning of the message would be disrupted and rendered ineffective. The interaction 
between source, message, and the decoder is what is essential to the establishment of 
credibility.45 It is here where any hints of dehumanization, in the form of stereotypes or 
out-group biases, will have an impact, since any misguided understanding between the 
decoder and encoder effectively ends the feedback loop.  
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C. DEHUMANIZATION REINFORCES INEFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION 
When looking at Schramm’s model of communication (Figure 3) it is clear that 
the encoder and decoder portions of communication are culturally dependent. Cultural 
norms and ideas about a group will have an impact on the message’s effectiveness. At the 
same time, when dehumanization occurs the ability to accurately understand an out-group 
is compromised. 
The effectiveness of coercion in limited war depends on the enemy’s perception of 
what will happen if he fails to comply.46 This means that any disgust or stereotyping between 
the encoder and decoder resulting from in-group or out-group biases will have a negative 
impact on their ability to communicate, and therefore influence the decoder. In other words, 
communication must be looked at holistically, especially when the message being conveyed 
consists of both actions and words. For example, someone saying the right thing but acting in 
a manner disrespectful or insulting would not represent effective messaging.  
Communication depends on successful feedback between two parties. This can be 
positive or negative. Dehumanization, for instance, reinforces negative impressions 
between the two parties. “If you communicate a negative attribute to those who ‘violate’ 
your cultural expectation, they are likely to become less receptive to your perspective and 
ideas… The other party may become defensive, accusing you of misbehaving, being 
unreasonable and impolite, or condescending—as indeed you are, from their 
perspective.”47 It is this cycle that is captured by the Coleman Raider Filter Check model 
(Figure 4), which ensures that the judgment of foreign behavior will result in 
inappropriate responses and a negative reaction from the out-group, akin to 
dehumanization.48 
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Figure 4.  Ineffective Communication Feedback49 
Something similar played out in Vietnam during the U.S. counterinsurgency 
efforts there. “When we did try to impose changes, for the better of course, the resistance 
of the people could seem like ingratitude or stupidity.”50 In these instances, attitudes 
which dehumanized the Vietnamese population led to their resistance to what the 
American forces wanted them to adopt. There was a complete breakdown in the 
communication loop necessary to influence a population, which then reinforced negative 
outcomes. 
In contrast to negative feedback loops during the Vietnam War, at least one 
veteran could look back on more positive relations during the Korean War. During the 
Korean War, then-Lieutenant Ben Malcom conducted unconventional warfare against 
North Korean targets. Although he was untrained in unconventional tactics, and did not 
have any Korean cultural training or language skills, Lieutenant Malcom was able to 
quickly build a positive relationship with his North Korean counterpart, Mr. Pak Choll. 
These two men built a relationship, not because of Malcom’s cultural aptitude, but 
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because they willingly shared intelligence, conducted risky operations, spent a lot of time 
together, and, most importantly, respected one another. It was this mutual respect that 
allowed Malcom to drive operations that mutually supported Korean and U.S. goals. 
Malcom and Mr. Pak were able to properly communicate with one another because they 
had a realistic understanding of each other.51 
D. DEHUMANIZATION PREVENTION AND SOCIAL PENETRATION 
The prevention of dehumanization is easiest at the beginning stages of an 
interaction, when the in-group and out-group biases initially are being formed.52 By 
preventing two groups from forming in the first place, investment in the local population 
becomes possible. It is this investment that is essential for an effective communication 
loop. The psychological term for this investment is social penetration.53 Conditions for 
successful humanization occur by reducing incidents of out-group and in-group biases. 
Insights gained from social penetration directly counter dehumanization thanks to 
the familiarity that is developed.54 Social penetration can also be thought of as achieving 
psychological closeness with another person. Social scientists recognize that creating a 
closer connection makes it more difficult for subjects to harm bystanders.55 This yields 
increased levels of social connection. 
A social penetration strategy is essential in irregular warfare. Dehumanization is 
more likely to occur when lack of familiarity between two people exists and there is 
psychological distance.56 This seems to be the inverse of the axiom, familiarity breeds 
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contempt. However, social penetration only takes place between an out-group and in-
group that have constant contact with one another. It is through the reduction of in-group 
out-group feelings that increased contact can occur between groups and that the 
individuals involved in this contact are more likely to cooperate.57 
The ability to properly influence and communicate with others is based on 
building relationships. Dehumanization will always prevent the establishment of a 
mutually respectful relationship. Colonel Edward Lansdale serves as an excellent 
example of someone who was able to build positive relations with people. While advising 
the Filipino government, which was fighting a communist insurgency in the 1950s, 
Colonel Lansdale built a reputation as an extremely effective advisor. Essential to his 
advising was his ability to interact with all people in a genuine matter. “Lansdale recalled 
earthier examples. He asked others to put themselves into the shoes of beleaguered 
peoples.”58 Whether he was influencing his strategic counterpart in the Philippines, 
Ramon Magsaysay, or interacting with local pig farmers, Col. Lansdale saw the 
surrounding population as essential to the conduct of counter-insurgency, and so worked 
to understand them. “Everywhere Lansdale went he took to the local people. He traveled 
(and) talked to everyone he met, and in doing so developed a sense of the local 
situation.”59 Thus he effectively humanized them, and continually worked on his ability 
to communicate better with them. 
E. PERSONAL INVESTMENT 
The final goal of this chapter is to discuss how these observations can be pulled 
together. By setting the conditions for a healthy communication feedback loop, troops 
will likely be more effective in dealing with the local population. Positive reinforcement 
will assist in the development of social penetration, leading to better and more effective 
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interactions with the population. As these positive events occur, troops who do not see 
themselves as members of an out-group will invest themselves in the area. This 
investment will also help them fight the impulse to delegitimize the local population, a 
common result of dehumanization, and one that is closely related to the systematic 
exploitation of a population.60 Ideally the troops will not differentiate their success from 
that of the locals with whom they are interacting. It is this investment and the resulting 
connection between security forces and the locals that will contribute to successful 
military operations. 
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III. THREE VIGNETTES 
The three cases discussed in this chapter represent a sample of counterinsurgency 
experiences. The first involves U.S. troops in the Philippines in the early 20th century. It 
is a positive example, wherein an individual or group of commanders was able to counter 
dehumanization and influence the population. This was achieved despite a cultural divide 
and the depiction of most non-Europeans at the time as savages who needed civilizing.61 
The second case is that of the U.S. troops who perpetrated the My Lai massacre in 
Vietnam. This case represents an extreme example of dehumanization between two 
cultures, resulting in a total inability of the Americans to understand and influence the 
local population, culminating in the massacre. Last, during the Sikh rebellion in India in 
the 1980s, humanization efforts were undertaken that led in the end to an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy. 
These three examples should help flesh out a framework to better understand how 
dehumanization impacts counter-insurgency strategy. Finally, they will demonstrate that, 
irrespective of specific cultures, dehumanization is a factor that should always be taken 
into account before attempting to influence a population. 
A. THE PHILIPPINES 
This section will focus on operations by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell that 
took place in South Luzon during 1901–1902. The context of the U.S. operations in the 
Philippines from 1899–1902 is often blamed on empire-building resulting from 
imperialism. However, they can also be said to have been driven by the notion of the 
‘White Man’s Burden’ to civilize the world.62 When looking at U.S. operations more 
closely, not all actions reflected a savage war. Some were rather nuanced operations in 
which the interactions between the U.S. commanders and the Filipinos were not marred 
by systematic dehumanization.63 
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At the outset of operations in the Philippines there were several incidents that 
appear to have been caused by the negative results of dehumanization. These incidents 
consisted of American troops firing on Filipino civilians resulting in casualties. 
Presumably, the soldiers felt free to do so because they saw the civilians as expendable.64 
However, during a period called the summer stalemate in August of 1899, U.S. military 
commanders in the Philippines determined that to persuade the population to be friendly 
to the U.S. post-conflict required a different attitude from U.S. troops.65 Thus, the most 
important aspect of overcoming dehumanization seemed to be realized: unless changes 
were made troops were risking their ability to influence the population. This shift was 
assisted by a massive new rotation of troops and political pressure from U.S. politicians 
due in part to better reporting practices by civilian reporters, which forced a restructuring 
and reorganization of the forces participating in the campaign.66  
The reorganized force began to focusing on using the Filipinos to both govern and 
fight alongside U.S. troops. “A far more radical step was the employment of Filipinos as 
military auxiliaries.”67 This emphasis on governing the Philippines, under U.S. control, 
set the conditions necessary for the military to acknowledge its responsibility for the 
welfare of the civilian population. This responsibility did not imply leniency toward 
either the guerrillas or civilians, but rather fairness. This shift is significant because it set 
the stage for U.S. commanders to see that it was their responsibility to build a functioning 
government.68 
One incident, in particular, exemplifying this shift took place in South Luzon in 
1901. It was led by Brigadier General Bell, who modeled a proper understanding of what 
was needed in order to influence the population. His strikes against both civilians and 
guerrillas were often harsh, but the population understood them to be consistent.69 This 
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consistency was made possible by Bell’s realization that it was necessary to deal with 
civilians as stakeholders in their community, rather than as sub-humans needed to be 
ruled over. 
Brigadier General Bell started from a situation of severe distrust between the 
locals and U.S. troops in the area. To rebuild trust, Bell promulgated a new policy for his 
officers that opposed carte blanche persecution directed against any Filipinos who 
objected to American pacification.70 Essential to Bell’s operations was the education of 
the local population about his orders, an excerpt of which is below. These were 
distributed through a series of telegraphic circulars that laid out rules, to include 
punishments for various topics: from assassination attempts, to distribution of food, to the 
collection of taxes, and finally the establishment protection zones.71 Bell realized that the 
population needed to understand the rules under which U.S. troops were operating, and 
an important part of his campaign was to communicate these rules.72 The circumstances 
surrounding his public awareness efforts came at a time of ambiguity in the campaign and 
served to clarify what counted as offenses and what the punishments would be for both 
the Americans and the Filipinos involved in the conflict. The effectiveness with which 
Bell communicated can be seen in the subsequent success he and his troops had in 
isolating the insurgents. This directly contributed to his success. 
Be considerate and courteous in manner, but firm and relentless in action. 
Say little, and let acts, not words, convey your meaning. Words from U.S. 
count for nothing. The more an officer talks the less they think he is going 
to do. The more he does and the less he says the more apprehensive they 
become while waiting for what is to happen next. Except when necessary 
to give due warning, do not tell them what you are going to do, but do it. 
Above all things do not threaten. Threats are invariably interpreted as a 
sign of weakness.73 
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The lesson to be learned from Bell’s example with respect to dehumanization is 
that by demonstrating fairness with respect to how U.S. troops would interact with the 
locals, Bell shifted punishment from ‘who you are’ to ‘what you have done.’ This simple 
distinction is essential for counteracting dehumanization while still conducting aggressive 
counter-insurgency operations. Making this distinction proved instrumental in quelling 
the insurgency in his area of operations. 
A potential counter-argument to Bell’s success worth noting is that during the 
conflict in the Philippines several atrocities did occur. These were aired in Congressional 
hearings. At these hearings, Bell was called to testify on his operations in Samar.74 
However, not all operations during the conflict in the Philippines from 1899-1902 were 
defined by the dehumanization of a population. In fact not dehumanizing the locals was a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for the U.S. government to be able to influence 
and then control the Philippine Islands. In a sense, success depended on scope. Because 
there was not blanket dehumanization, commanders had the space in which to conduct 
effective counter-insurgency operations and population-centric efforts. 
B. MY LAI INCIDENT 
The My Lai massacre occurred in Vietnam on March 16, 1968. Although much 
has been written about the My Lai massacre, this section will only focus on systematic 
dehumanization that was occurring within the U.S. army during this time, creating the 
conditions for the massacre to take place. The My Lai massacre began when Company C 
of 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Division began clearing a series of villages. These villages 
were reported to be Viet Cong strongholds. While clearing these villages, the soldiers 
began systematically questioning, then killing, civilians they suspected of being Viet 
Cong supporters. The death toll has been estimated between 300-500 civilians.75 My 
argument is that My Lai was made possible due to an organizational acceptance of 
dehumanization and an inability of the U.S. troops to effectively communicate with the 
                                                 
74 Linn. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 221–224. 
75 Department of the Army. Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary 
Investigations into the My Lai Incident (The Peers Report), Volumes I-III (1970). 
 25 
population. It is important to note that several other factors influenced the My Lai 
incident, all of which were exacerbated by dehumanization. 
The evidence of dehumanization during My Lai can be found in the systematic 
killing of civilians that took place. One factor that led to this dehumanization was the 
failure of the U.S. leadership to clearly define the goals of the conflict, resulting in 
frustration for both the U.S. troops and the Vietnamese.76 Additional factors that 
contributed to the massacre at My Lai include Lieutenant Calley’s inexperience as a 
Platoon Leader in Charlie Company, as well as the group dynamics within Charlie 
Company. It was these factors that contributed to the severity of the massacre at My Lai. 
However, even outside of these particulars there was a policy that contributed to 
dehumanization of civilians and enemy combatants within Vietnam.77 This included the 
use of body counts as a metric of success. Many of the civilians killed at My Lai were 
counted as enemy combatants to inflate the numbers reported up the chain of command. 
“After the massacre, the radioman said that Captain Earl R. Michles told him ‘to make it 
look good.’”78 A systematic cover-up involving the crimes committed at My Lai included 
elements at every level up to the Division Command.79 A lack of willingness and 
initiative in the conduct of missions overall ran directly counter to the operational goals. 
The unfocused nature of the military’s broad goals would ultimately impact the people 
sent out on operations, especially when U.S. commanders in Vietnam began to create 
operational goals focusing on body counts.80 This further complicated the mission of the 
people conducting them, since they were focused on the subsidiary aim of creating war 
dead rather than on winning the war and stabilizing Vietnam.81 
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Figure 5 represents a 1960s U.S. Army tool that outlines how soldiers were 
supposed to deal with the Vietnamese population. 
 
Figure 5.  Nine Rules 
However, in reality, the treatment of the local population tended to be harsh. This 
was compounded by the fact that the basic training that soldiers underwent concentrated 
on dehumanizing the enemy, and trained the recruits to kill. The overhaul that had been 
done on training after World War II and Korea focused on these aspects in order to 
enhance the U.S. troops’ ability to kill during conflict. This training contrasted sharply 
with the skills needed to achieve stability in a counterinsurgency environment.82 
Certain individual and psychological factors present during Vietnam compounded 
the problem of dehumanization. Many soldiers fighting in Vietnam felt betrayed both by 
the United States’ conduct of the war and their role in it.83 Jonathan Shay explores this 
idea of betrayal in his work based on his counseling of Vietnam veterans. “Once or twice 
I have tried to explore with veterans these concepts of victory and defeat. I have 
abandoned these discussions because the sense of betrayal is still too great and the 
equation of defeat with abandonment by God and personal devaluation still too vivid.”84 
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Although those feelings were not universal, their existence within the Army had a 
corrupting and, in the case of My Lai, disastrous effect.85  
An army, such as the U.S. Army in Vietnam, is a moral force capable of using 
deadly force. The turmoil that permeated American society during the Vietnam War 
influenced U.S. troops and shook the military establishment to its foundations. This then 
contributed to weaken the moral compass U.S. troops needed to guide their operations. 86 
The U.S. Army in Vietnam was more susceptible to dehumanizing the enemy and the 
local population, who appeared indistinguishable to most troops. 
Another common focus of anger and aggression were the very people the 
young soldier (in Vietnam) had come to ‘protect.’ “The way to win the 
war,” went a common joke, “is to load all the gooks in the South on boats, 
kill the ones in the North, and sink the boats.” (Sigmund) Freud noted that 
jokes, like dreams, frequently serve as wish fulfillments.87 
Lieutenant David Donovan experienced similar incidents of dehumanization when 
on his first patrol in Vietnam. This was before he was assigned to a small outpost, and led 
a District Team.  
“Look,” the lieutenant said, “we have enough trouble with our guys as it 
is. If we tried to charge every man that had a run-in with one of the locals 
we would just piss everyone off even more. Our guys would do less than 
they are now! Believe me, these men just see slopes. They don’t see good 
or bad, they just see slopes, and they don’t like any of them. If I can get 
my guys to tolerate these people and maybe be nice to a few of them, I 
figure I’m ahead of the game. If I started handing out Article 15’s just 
because a guy is a shithead and doesn’t like the natives, I’d probably be 
fragged within a week.”88 
 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam had very little social contact with the Vietnamese. Less 
than one percent of U.S. forces took part in operations where they lived and fought side 
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by side with Vietnamese allies on a daily basis.89 For the majority of U.S. forces, their 
lack of social contact made it very easy to regard the Vietnamese as comprising an out-
group and to dehumanize them. This is in keeping with Stanley Milgram’s classic study 
where subjects were instructed to shock an unseen person. A statistically significant 
number of Milgram’s subjects would continue to shock the unseen person as long as they 
were told to, even after they could hear the person scream in pain. 90 Troops who felt they 
were following orders would have been easier to lead in committing atrocities because 
the use of authorization can override standard moral considerations.91 Creating 
psychological distance through the use of name calling is one technique to justify 
atrocities. Soldiers were not killing people like themselves; rather, they were killing 
gooks or slopes. When civilians could be included in ‘body counts,’ it becomes easier to 
see how seemingly normal people could be induced to doing something which, under 
different circumstances, they would recognize as cruel. Both Shay's examination of the 
sense of betrayal among soldiers in Vietnam and Milgram’s study point to the 
psychological factors that influenced soldiers and help explain why members of Charlie 
Company proved unable to recognize and stop their dehumanization of the Vietnamese. 
C. SIKH RETAKING OF THE TEMPLE 
Finally, let U.S. turn to the Sikh insurgency that took place in the 1980s in India. 
Key to this period is the state’s response to the creation of an in-group and out-group 
along religious lines.92 One operation, code-named Black Thunder, illustrates how the 
state’s eventual response to dehumanization resulted in the relatively peaceful 
reclamation of the holy Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple, which insurgents used as their 
stronghold. 
The Sikh-Hindu divide in India developed in the 1980s. The genesis of the Sikh 
insurgency was a concentrated effort by some Sikhs to attain autonomy in the region.93 
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Radicalization increased following an unsuccessful earlier operation at the Golden 
Temple. Operation Blue Star, in 1984, reinforced perceptions that Sikhs were being 
targeted by the military forces simply for being Sikhs. The military did not take sufficient 
care in separating radicals from moderates. Thus, dehumanization of Sikhs took place. 
Sikhs felt they were all being lumped together as members of an out-group.  
An important precursor to Operation Black Thunder was Operation Blue Star 
which took place between the Third and Eighth of June, 1984. The government’s extreme 
actions taken by the government during Operation Blue Star caused one dedicated 
government security officer, Simranjit Singh Mann, to question his government’s 
intentions regarding the Sikhs. “In his resignation letter to the president of India, Zail 
Singh, Mann compared the government’s heavy handed action to the British atrocities … 
In even stronger terms, he accused the government of being ‘bent upon committing 
genocide of the Sikhs.”94 It was within this environment of animosity and 
dehumanization that K.P.S. Gill began his operations to quell the Sikh insurgency. 
To stop the insurgency, K.P.S. Gill — the policeman in charge, and himself a 
Sikh — determined that it was essential to control the perceptions of the surrounding 
population.95 His actions highlight how counterinsurgency should be thought about in 
terms of reincorporating an out-group.96 By focusing his efforts on defining the terrorists 
not as cultural enemies, but as misguided peers, Gill was able to gain support among the 
broader Sikh community, thus taking away the insurgents’ ability to influence the 
community. This distinction was essential to his plan for how to defeat the insurgency in 
Punjab.  
The details of Operation Black Thunder clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the divide Gill was able to achieve. Operation Black Thunder began on 30 April, 1986 
with a blockade of the Golden Temple. Already Gill had worked to mobilize the civilian 
population against the goals of the insurgents with community meetings where he spoke 
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against the radicalization of their religion. The actual operation resulted in very little 
bloodshed. The police, instead, successfully cleared out and separated the insurgents from 
the civilian population occupying the Golden Temple.97 Key to this operation was that 
the Indian troops, led by the police, were able to clear the insurgent stronghold without 
heavy loss of life. The ability to separate the insurgents from the civilians was heavily 
influenced by Gill’s humanization of the Sikh people, and his insistence that the 
insurgency not be fought through the security apparatus, but by convincing Sikhs that it 
was not in their interest to support the insurgency. 
The conflict in the Punjab was not particularly bloody, with only an estimated 
8,000 casualties overall, but it did consist of a decade of terror attacks and resulted in the 
assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, in retaliation for Operation 
Blue Star. The shift in tactics undertaken by K.P.S. Gill (along with other government 
officials) clearly demonstrated their desire to get the population to disregard what the 
insurgents said, and to make clear that the Indian government was not trying to 
exterminate or oppress the Sikh people. “If the Sikh people are to free themselves of the 
self-inflicted slavery of their minds … they will have to reject not only this doctrine of 
failure and infirmity, but equally the leadership and institutions that propagate and 
perpetuate it.”98 
Some explanations for how the Sikh rebellion was defeated give credit to other 
sources. Mann, who became active in the Sikh movement, believes that the militants were 
destroyed from within, by a problem of leadership. However, by focusing on fighting 
ideas and affecting a separation between destructive and constructive ideas it can be 
argued that Gill’s efforts were integral to denying insurgent leaders a following. “Thus, 
one lesson that could be distilled from Gill’s example is that it takes intimate familiarity 
with what insurgents are peddling to undo them.”99 Indeed, instead of fighting the 
insurgents directly, which would have resulted in more bloodshed, Gill fought the 
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insurgents’ ideas. It was this ability to fight the separatists ideologically, given his 
knowledge of them, that ensured Gill was not fighting members of an out-group, but 
rather trying to influence members of his own in-group. 
D. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THESE VIGNETTES 
Each of these examples illuminates a different point related to the impact of 
dehumanization or its absence in counterinsurgency operations. The first example of Bell 
in the Philippines demonstrates how a lack of dehumanization does not necessarily make 
for more peaceful operations. Rather, Bell demonstrated that by effectively 
communicating with the locals, which he could do by not dehumanizing them, his 
operations were both brutal and effective in pacifying the area. This effective 
communication is what is absent in our second example of My Lai. Here, the U.S. Army 
established a command structure and culture that dehumanized the local population, 
making it impossible to effectively communicate with the Vietnamese, ensuring that the 
results would end up being brutal and ineffective as well as crossing moral lines. Gill’s 
example, meanwhile, suggests that even in the absence of significant cross-cultural 
differences, avoiding dehumanization still must factor into a counterinsurgency strategy. 
This is because as the insurgents attempt to mobilize the populace against the 
government, they can most easily do so through the creation of in-groups and out-groups. 
As K.P.S. Gill demonstrated, overcoming this split and preventing dehumanization by 
government forces is essential. It is this (re)humanizing influence that features 
prominently in the example in the next chapter. 
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IV. COINCIDENCE? 
A. WHAT IS VSO? 
In this chapter I want to revisit the principles discussed in Chapter Two and 
examine them in the context of Village Stability Operations (VSO). My experiences in 
Afghanistan during 2009-2010 will feature prominently to highlight some of the key 
aspects of VSO that work to combat dehumanization and lead to the type of personal 
investment I believe necessary to influence a local population.  
VSO has been employed in Afghanistan since early 2009. Many articles have 
been written about why this program has proven successful.100 Members of the Senate 
Armed Service Committee and others have said that VSO has proved a significant threat 
to Taliban interests in Afghanistan.101 Among the reasons given: decentralized 
government and localized security facilitated by VSO and the development of an Afghan 
Local Police (ALP) have helped achieve stability in Afghanistan.102 As the main 
ingredient of its success VSO has been able to formalize bottom-up and top-down 
approaches in tying the districts of Afghanistan to the central government.103 Others have 
described VSO and the ALP as focusing U.S. efforts on Afghan solutions to the problems 
in Afghanistan.104 All of these articles claim that VSO has been successful in 
Afghanistan, but miss what I believe to be an essential reason for its success. 
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The purpose of this chapter is less to examine VSO, however, than to point out 
how several of the tenets of VSO concept counter the natural inclination to dehumanize 
the native population and the enemy. For instance, VSO creates conditions whereby those 
conducting the mission actually become invested in the area and the people. It is this 
investment that lays the foundation for preventing dehumanization and creating the 
conditions needed to influence the population. The investment in a community and the 
recognition of other people as individuals is essential to overcoming dehumanization and 
its impact.105 The VSO program was not designed to counter dehumanization of local 
populations. However, it has the potential to have this effect, which is one, I will argue, 
U.S. forces should capitalize on. 
Three points are integral to my argument. First, VSO successfully mitigates the 
factors that will lead to dehumanization. Second, as VSO is implemented and counters 
dehumanization influences, its tactical successes become significant. Third, when a strategy 
is designed that reduces dehumanization and achieves tactical success, more effective 
influence on and compliance by the population results. All three points fit with the broader 
argument that when designing a strategy to influence a population, understanding the tactical 
impact of dehumanization is essential to success. What would greatly enhance the conduct of 
VSO is if the principles of dehumanization were understood before deploying, instead of 
being learned through experience, as during my deployment. 
B. WHAT IS VSO, AND HOW DOES IT FIGHT DEHUMANIZATION? 
To lay the groundwork for the first point, that VSO mitigates dehumanization, 
requires a brief description of VSO. VSO is conducted by an embedded U.S. force that 
lives with and participates in the lives of the people in a specific Afghan village. The site 
can be small, centered around a dense population center and includes a number of Afghan 
nationals, usually members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National 
Army Special Forces (ANASOF). These individuals cohabitate with the U.S. forces and 
depend on each other for security. 
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Mutual security is key. Otherwise, forcing this type of intimate closeness could 
lead to resentment, most clearly exemplified by the colloquialism, “Familiarity breeds 
contempt.” However, because the ANA and U.S. personnel share responsibility for 
security, cooperation becomes immediately necessary, preventing resentment. People can 
ignore one another while eating in the same room and they can politely look away while 
passing one another in a hall on their way to bed, but they cannot ignore one another 
when they depend on each other to keep everyone safe while they sleep. This distinction 
ensures that a foundation of trust is built between the security forces. Having to be co-
dependent with a group of ANA, who could otherwise be seen as belonging to an out-
group by the U.S. troops, sets the conditions for U.S. troops to be able to humanize the 
local population. Basically, people cannot help but humanize those they must cooperate 
with.106 This cooperation breaks down the differences between preconceived in-group 
and out-groups.107 
VSO also ties a U.S. force to a certain area, where the people implementing VSO 
know that their mission success is tied to the welfare and attitudes of the surrounding 
population. The population surrounding a VSO site is the target of influence operations. 
Because they are physically present, members of the U.S. force are able to interact with 
the same people consistently, increasing connections between the two groups.108 The 
consequent consistency of interactions, combined with the motivation for mission success 
being tied to the surrounding population, creates incentives for investment in the area by 
the U.S. personnel attempting to have an impact there. 
None of these three aspects are cultural constructs. They are not created by 
cultural training and are not enhanced by greater cultural familiarity. Instead, they are 
natural by-products of the personal connections that result from needing to work with(in) 
a population. In a sense, what I am talking about is reward-based influence, a result of 
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mutual respect, not greater cross-cultural familiarity.109 It thus turns out that a major 
element in countering dehumanization grows out of understanding how to build up 
influence to accomplish U.S. goals in an area. It is borne out of the proclivities of living 
at VSO sites, not thanks to cultural sensitivity training. 
One sees this in the consistency that living in a VSO site fosters. U.S. personnel 
and the locals have no choice; they have to talk every day, and this automatically 
increases effective communication. This increase in effective communication in turn 
breaks down any lingering out-group/in-group barriers.  
Being attached to a single area and placing the emphasis on similarities rather 
than differences provides the best framework for disrupting the likelihood of 
dehumanization. For instance, I was invited to the wedding of a young man who had 
previously been a Taliban fighter in a neighboring province. He returned home at the 
request of his father, a village elder, to get married. His father invited me to the wedding 
with my ANASF counterpart and spent hours with U.S. during the meal. It was at this 
event that the father asked for my assurance that his son would be safe from reprisal 
attacks for leaving the Taliban and returning home. My experience up to this point had 
been that this particular village elder was a problem. However, I understood that by 
making a concerted effort to provide his son security I could demonstrate my investment 
in him and his area. Once I agreed to his request the two of U.S. were able to build a 
more effective dialogue and greater mutual trust, which proved excellent tools through 
which to influence the area. 
C. TACTICAL SUCCESS IN VSO 
Effective communication and investment in an area have cumulative effects. 
Building trust and credibility between two groups, which is a natural result of personal 
investment in an area, enhances the effectiveness of a message. During a 
counterinsurgency, deterrence is an effective tool for tactical-level operations. To 
communicate deterrence, the credibility and nature of the threats depend on both the 
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allowable rules of engagement and support from the local government. A credible, 
sufficient threat is easier to communicate to an opponent at the tactical level when there 
is a clearly defined strategy. In addition to the significance of ease of communication, a 
familiarity with the opponent allows a better assessment of what will be seen as credible 
and sufficient to enforce the threat accompanying the deterrent.110 It is this familiarity 
with an opponent along with the ability to tactically deter him that distinguishes tactical 
deterrence from deterrence at a strategic level. 
Here, for example, is how I coerced the local Afghans in my area of operations to 
establish an Afghan Local Police (ALP) force. I could not have done this without being 
locally invested in the area and without the effective communication loop resulting from 
my constant presence.111 I had serious problems raising an ALP because of Taliban 
influence and intimidation in the area. Initially, I attempted to use threats, specifically the 
threat of aggressive searches of any buildings inhabited by those I suspected of helping 
the Taliban. My aim was to put enough pressure on the people to force them to build an 
ALP. I attempted to use this technique to coerce the development of an ALP over a two-
month period, but was still unable to develop an ALP even with the support of the 
Governor and Chief of Police. However, as I continued to interact with the locals, I also 
realized that I had been framing the development of an ALP incorrectly. Instead of using 
threats, I needed to use promises in order to achieve my desired effect. It was coming to 
the realization that rewards, based on an in-depth understanding of the needs of the 
population, would carry more weight than threats that enabled me to be successful.112 
The necessary feedback to identify this flaw, and the need to switch to a carrot 
instead of a stick approach, was greatly helped by the fact that I was dealing with the 
population on a daily basis and a certain degree of honesty had developed between the 
village elders and myself. Much of this honesty stemmed from my decision to fast during 
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Ramadan, as I described in the Introduction. It was during this time that I found that the 
elders were willing to engage me on a variety of topics, like Islam and Christianity, 
which allowed U.S. to build a better foundation for mutual understanding. My fasting 
also supported my narrative that ODA and I were not there to fundamentally alter their 
lives. Rather, my fasting was a tangible proof of my respect not only for them (as elders), 
but also for their religion. 
What grew out of the relationship that developed during this period was a mutually 
beneficial agreement. I promised not to search any houses and the village elders promised to 
develop an ALP and secure their own villages effectively. This co-dependence was grounded 
in much more realistic expectations than those we had previously tried to develop. The result 
was not only the development of an ALP, and increased security in the area, but a greater 
trust between U.S. troops and locals in the region. 
D. STRATEGIC LESSONS OF VSO 
VSO compels the people implementing it to actually engage at a personal level 
with the population they are tasked with influencing. The importance of this cannot be 
overestimated. Liking and cultivating a relationship with the people with whom you are 
dealing conveys respect. Because dehumanization establishes unrealistic expectations of 
the population in general, threats levied based on these expectations will inherently fail. 
Hence, dehumanization undermines what is needed in order to achieve the tactical 
successes required to influence the population. Threats may be necessary, but they have 
to be realistic. When viewed through this lens, the essential communication facilitated by 
VSO is essential to any population-influencing strategy. 
Why is it important to understand and like someone that you are trying to 
influence? The answer to this requires discussion. Nowhere in military doctrine is it 
required that someone understand or like the person they are working with. Often, 
doctrine bends over backwards to overcome any cultural reservations that a U.S. service 
member might have regarding a target population. It rarely focuses on similarities and 
how to communicate through those similarities, rather than despite differences. By 
requiring communication and personal investment, VSO can be conducted in a way that 
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the ties success of an ODA to cooperation with the local population, instead of meeting 
metrics that only matter to the U.S. military.  
Inadvertently, VSO manages to succeed outside the usual U.S. policy constructs. 
Instead of treating VSO sites as strategic hamlets, or game pieces on a map, it is more 
prudent to recognize that VSO works because it is localized strategy that focuses on 
personality and personal relationships.113 By leveraging these relationships, it creates a 
counter to the temptation to dehumanize. It is through this leverage that VSO gains real 
strategic effectiveness. Most argue that influencing a population is essential to successful 
counter-insurgency strategy. VSO offers the best available platform for affecting this 
influence, community by community. 
In counterinsurgency operations, or unconventional warfare, a person must 
influence the surrounding population. Why influence is not broken down into a common 
sense approach that uses terms like ‘us’ and ‘the insurgents’ is beyond this author, 
especially since it naturally follows that when someone likes and respects you, it is easier 
to influence them. We see this effect in conditions established by VSO. Hence, an 
argument can be made that when you establish the conditions for someone to like and 
respect you, that target will listen to the message you are conveying without any undue 
interference. Once this essential element is met, VSO can move on to the larger goal of 
influencing the population to reject your mutual opponents. 
E. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Tamping down dehumanization was an unintended benefit of VSO, which 
occurred after my decision to fast for Ramadan and was reinforced as I involved myself 
in the lives of the Afghans surrounding my base in Khakrez. I did not consciously set out 
to create a counter to the likelihood of dehumanization, but as I reflected on my 
deployment after the fact I realized how powerful a factor dehumanization is during 
operations that are intended to influence a population. 
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Essentially this chapter reviewed five factors. The first three were the VSO 
attributes of mutual security, consistent presence, and investment in the area. Together 
they counter dehumanization. The other two factors, humanizing the local population and 
attempting to build a group with them to fight the insurgents, helped achieve tactical 
success when it comes to influencing the population. All together these factors offer an 
exportable idea for how to counter dehumanization and create conditions necessary for 
influencing a population beyond just Afghanistan. These factors are not unique to VSO. 
Rather, any strategy designed to influence a population must consider both how to make 
the troops conducting that operation care about the area and how to get them to 
effectively and immediately counter incidents of dehumanization which are so common 
during conflicts.  
For my ODA, the development of an ALP in Khakrez amounted to more than just 
the creation of an additional layer of security. It was also a symbol representing the 
choice of the local Afghan elders to support the government over the insurgents in the 
area. The Shura announcing the creation of the ALP was attended by the Kandahar 
Provincial Governor, and an assistant to the Minister of the Interior (MOI) among others. 
During this meeting, Mullah Agha, a local village elder and former Taliban commander, 
stood up and said, “the worst thing that happened to the Taliban in Khakrez is Captain 
Alex coming here.” 114 His opinion of me and my ODA was not based on the fact we had 
been able to kill and capture the most insurgents in the area. Neither did he praise U.S. 
because we had built the most wells or delivered the most aid to the people of Khakrez. 
Rather Mullah Agha’s sentiment reflected the fact that my ODA had bought into my idea 
of building relationships with the surrounding population. We would talk to anyone who 
visited our VSO site, which showed in how we operated on a daily basis and directly 
contributed to our success. 
What do anecdotes like mine about VSO mean? Add enough of them up and they 
should make clear how VSO prevents dehumanization and how essential the prevention 
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of dehumanization is to influencing a population. Rather than creating ink spots of 
security as the aim of counterinsurgent strategy. VSO establishes investment in an area. 
As this chapter indicates, it is this investment that is critical to both countering 
dehumanization and achieving effective communication. Without both of these 
components, influencing a population is impossible. One difference between using ‘ink 
spots’ of security and designing a strategy based on countering dehumanization is that to 
really influence a population requires U.S. to stop thinking about using locations 
strategically and instead think about using people strategically. Counter-dehumanization 
strategy invests in the people, which is very different than just using the people who 
happen to be found in strategic locations. This distinction is actually key. 
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It was very difficult for a different-looking, different-acting, different-
speaking, different-thinking person to be accepted in that conservative, 
highly traditional culture. There were just too many slips to be made, too 
many oversights to be misconstrued, and too many attitudes to be changed 
for real acceptance to come easy. I felt that this gesture from some of the 
older men of the village was a signal that my team’s efforts to get along 
and be helpful were really being appreciated.115 
A. CULTURAL RESPECT 
The demands of population-centric warfare require a new emphasis on countering 
dehumanization. Although this emphasis cannot guarantee influence, it establishes an 
excellent starting point for anyone to be able to interact with, communicate with, and, 
ultimately, influence another person. This factor is also independent of whether the two 
people share a similar cultural background or not. Soldiers expected to influence a local 
population should be trained in how to respect the culture they will be operating in. But 
achieving respect is different from simply learning about a list of cultural norms that 
apply to that culture. 
By training to counter the formation of in-groups and out-groups, and the 
dehumanization that is likely to follow, a soldier should be able to take information about 
the population and properly understand it without bias. Once a soldier is dealing with a 
population without bias, his communication and influence techniques will be improved. 
The difference between cultural training as the memorization of a list of cultural 
traits and cultural training designed to counter dehumanization is simple. With the former, 
one is expected to learn about what makes members of another culture different. With the 
latter, one wants to accept the culture for what it is. Recognizing this slight, but essential, 
framing distinction can help prevent the first steps of in-group and out-group formation and 
will allow soldiers communicating with locals and adversaries alike to be able to better 
understand what rewards or deterrents would be more effective in any given situation. 
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For instance, when I fasted for Ramadan I demonstrated my respect for Islam and 
the culture of the Afghans around me. The respect I earned allowed me to better 
communicate both threats and rewards, and helped establish the conditions for my 
success in establishing an ALP and building support for the government in the area. This 
better communication was not a result of my having an anthropologist’s understanding of 
Afghanistan. I had little ability to speak Pashto, the local language, so this was not a 
factor. It was instead the credibility that was given to me by the Afghan locals because I 
made it obvious that I respected them; they in turn gave me respect. Indeed, the risk that 
the elders in Khakrez took to establish an ALP would not have been possible without the 
trust built from our mutual respect and my time in the district with them. 
B. IS DEHUMANIZATION A SLIPPERY SLOPE? 
Is dehumanization as simple as just using derogatory terms? Is it a slippery slope? 
If you start applying out-group tendencies, will you eventually dehumanize your enemy? 
The research on this matter is unclear. However, there is evidence that indicates 
dehumanization is necessary for terrorist groups to recruit members to commit 
violence.116 What is also clear is that once an in-group and out-group are created, even 
artificially, tensions between the two are reinforced and can escalate quickly.117 Once 
two groups are created, the use of derogatory terms can set in motion this escalation.118 
Whether the terms are based on race, gender, tribe, etc., their use is essential to the 
increase in tensions.119 History suggests that even the relatively common use of 
derogatory terms during warfare represents the first step in defining the existence of an 
out-group, something that needs to be avoided in population-centric warfare. 
Even during the initial stages of dehumanization, the use of derogatory terms 
causes unrealistic expectations that prevent the crafting of a message that will be properly 
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decoded by the audience.120 So, even if the more negative consequences of 
dehumanization — genocide or massacres — do not occur, starting down the road to 
dehumanization will still have an impact. For our purposes, it does not matter whether the 
slippery slope of dehumanization gets more slippery, because even in its initial stages it 
negatively impacts a force’s ability to influence a population. 
C. PUTTING IT TOGETHER 
The people discussed in this thesis: Bell, Lansdale, Gill, Donovan, and others 
were able to leverage and influence populations and people during irregular conflict. 
Success can be explained by a myriad of factors. Personal attributes, for instance, cannot 
be discounted. However, an essential part of their success was their ability to deal with 
people effectively. They interacted with people, even when they came from different 
cultures, as members of an in-group. As a result, they built a solid base of respect. They 
invested themselves in the population, and they worked with and ensured that they 
understood the population. 
The cultural training U.S. forces receive often focuses on the cultural differences 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. However, after World War II, as part of their preparation for 
duty in occupied Japan, U.S. troops were shown the film “Our Job in Japan.” The film 
concentrated on similarities between the two cultures in an effort to help troops relate to 
the local Japanese. “The most striking aspect of the film… was its fundamentally 
optimistic message. Neither blood, culture, nor history drove the Japanese to war, but 
rather socialization and indoctrination of recent vintage. When all was said, reeducation 
did not in fact seem to be such an insuperable task.”121 It is this depiction of the Japanese 
and their troops as human that represented a distinct shift away from their 
dehumanization, which had been such an important feature of wartime propaganda 
films.122 This reframing of cultural training as a discussion of proper etiquette, rather 
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than as an introduction to a foreign culture offers a far better platform for how to 
influence others than beginning with a list of differences between the cultures. 
It is too simple to condemn dehumanization as bad. However, currently there are 
no training programs tied to our population-centric warfare goals that discuss 
dehumanization as something that has been reducing our ability to successfully influence 
the people we have been tasked to work with. This thesis has aimed to provide a jumping 
off point for that discussion. Dehumanization creates unrealistic expectations by 
essentially reinforcing an others’ membership in an out-group. Those unrealistic 
expectations result in an inability to communicate effectively. This inability to 
communicate limits any ability to influence the population, and hinders the successful 
execution of population-centric warfare. Admittedly, preventing dehumanization may not 
guarantee influence over a population, but it does remove a major impediment. 
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